Quantitative easing og hyperinflation i Bolivia

Den 9 Juli 1985 tog den amerikanske økonomon Jeffery Sachs til Bolivia

Ikke angivet Ikke angivet,

29/03/2011

Den 9 Juli 1985 tog den amerikanske økonomon Jeffery Sachs til Bolivia. Han var blevet inviteret til Bolivia af nogle Bolivianske politikere for at hjælpe landet af med dets hyperinflation.

Jeffrey Sachs skriver om dette:

(Min kursiv)

First, I understood the basic monetary forces that led to hyperinflation.
The government was printing money to finance a large budget
deficit. Initially I did not understand the origins and dynamics of the
budget deficit, nor the politics of the budgetary process. But I did understand
that the Bolivian government was not creditworthy enough to
sell bonds to the private sector at home or abroad. Instead, it had to sell
its bonds directly to the Central Bank of Bolivia (or BCB in its Spanish
acronym) in return for fresh cash to pay the army, miners, and teachers.
The Bolivian hyperinflation was in this sense no different from others
from economic history. Like those before it, the government was printing
money to pay its bills, and as it printed the money it was driving
down the value of the currency—and driving up the price of goods.

As the government paid the salaries, the injection of new pesos into
circulation fueled the precipitous rise of prices. With each injection of
Bolivian currency, people would take their pesos to the black market to
buy dollars. The price of a dollar in terms of pesos soared: about 5,000
pesos per dollar in June 1983, about 10,000 pesos per dollar by January
1984, about 50,000 pesos per dollar by June 1984, about 250,000 pesos
per dollar by December 1984, and 2 million pesos per dollar by July
1985, when a team of three inexperienced economists arrived. The
goods in the shop by this time carried dollar price tags, even though the
purchases were still made in pesos. A one-dollar item, therefore, cost almost
2 million pesos in July 1985, up from 5,000 pesos just two years earlier.
In the single year between July 1984 and July 1985, prices had risen
by more than 3,000 percent (thirty times).

Så vi har altså en regering der ikke har penge til at betale husholdingsudgifterne og så vælger at trykke pengene.

The budget deficit was on the order of
10 percent of GDP, all financed by printing money (technically by "borrowing"
the money from the BCB).

Først er det værd at nævne at USAs budgetunderskud har været oppe på 9.5 af BNP

Da Bolivia bare trykkede penge ledte det til hyperinflation. Hvorfor skulle quantitative easing ikke føre til præcist det samme resultat?!

Ben Bernanke nægter godt nok at han trykker penge, på trods af at han modsiger sig selv

Dog skal det nævnes at USA ikke financierer 100% af deres forbrug med trykte penge. Andelen af lånte penge er godt 40%.

Ifølge Cia world factbook var USAs 2010-underskud på 1305 mia dollar (3392-2092). En kilde siger at the Fed vil printe 600 mia i QE2. Det er godt halvdelen af 2010 underskuddet.

Så det er ikke helt Bolivianske proportioner endnu, men i det lange løb er resultatet det samme!

Hvorfor er der ingen der kan se parallen til Weimar Tyskland og Bolivia i 1980erne? Hvis man trykker penge kommer der inflation, så er det lige meget hvor fancy et navn man finder til det.

Bernanke kommer fra tid til anden om at de vil hive pengene ind igen eller at han vil hæve renten "når det bliver nødvendigt"

Men er der nogen der tror på det? Allerede nu med de rekord lave renter går næsten 10% af skatteindtægterne til renter alene (ingen afbetaling). Overvej hvis det var din privatøkonomi der så sådan ud.

Jeg føler det som at jeg er et af de eneste normale mennesker tilbage i en verden der er blevet sindsyg. Historien gentager sig for øjnene af millioner af mennesker og de forstår det slet ikke.

Kilde: